IDF Clashes with Syrian Army in the Golan

The Syrian Army breaches the DMZ for the first time, breaking international law.

Israeli tanks fired shells at a Syrian army position under construction within the internationally recognized DMZ between Israel and Syria.  Considering that Syria is in direct cooperation with Iran and Hezbollah, the move to build a permanent base in what should be a demilitarized area has now inflamed an already tense situation.

The IDF said they fired the shots because the Syrian army’s actions is in direct violation of the 1974 truce agreement between Israel and Syria. The agreement “prohibits the entry of heavy construction tools or military vehicles into the demilitarized zone.”

The action occurred very close to the Druze village of Hader.  Hader was the site of an incident earlier this month involving Syrian regime forces and Jihadist, which appeared to threaten the safety of the Druze village. The IDF pledged to protect the village of Hader even though it is to the East of the DMZ due to it being Druze.

Leading to War?

The actions by the Syrian forces while not severe from a military standpoint, represent a serious escalation because it directly challenges Israel’s assertion that the IDF would in fact push back on Iranian influence so close to Israel’s border.

Does this mean war is about to break out?  No.  But the escalation is certainly leading the region in that direction.  It also  calls into question the IDF’s defensive posture as unsuitable for an enemy looking to push forward and win. Look for increasing skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian border region on the Golan Heights.  With Syria and Hezbollah beginning to encircle Northern Israel, the IDF has become increasingly prepared to attack within Syria to push back on the Iranian led advance.

 

War In Israel’s North Draws Close As Syrian Regime Advances in Beit Jinn

According to sources in Syria, the Syrian Regime has made headway with its war on ISIS and is advancing within the Beit Jinn area.  This brings it closer to the Golan DMZ.

 

Led by their elite Ghiath Forces, the Syrian Army began the assault by firing several surface-to-ground missiles towards the Jihadist strong holds. Attack choppers continually attacked the jihadist positions at the farms north of Beit Jinn.

With most reports indicating that the Jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham was losing control, this is a double edge sword as far as Israel is concerned.  While Israel does not want ISIS on its border, it also does not want the Syria Regime, which now acts as an enabler for Iran to have access to the Golan border as well.

This development places the decision to send the IDF to at least secure the Druze village of Hader even more critical than it was at the end of the last week.

With the Syria-Iran-Russia axis on the move against both Saudi Arabia and Israel, the IDF has little time for a final decision on whether or not time has come to directly face Syria itself.

Is Israel Trying to Wrest Control of the Druze from Syria?

With Russia and Iran solidly working together to etablish a new Middle Eastern paradigm, Israel appears to be creating one of its own.  Late Friday, the IDF responded to the Duze village of Hader’s request for help against ISIS by stating that Israel will absolutely lend aid to the embattled village.  There is only one problem, Hader is not within the current boundaries of Israel, but rather just East in Syria.

The village residents felt so threatened by ISIS that many attempted to break into Israel for safety where many of their relatives live.  The Druze are a stateless people who are spread between Syria, Southern Lebanon, and Israel.  In Israel, they are considered loyal, with many serving in the top units.

With Syria and Iran threatening Israeli security, the plight of Hader could well be the key for Israel’s entry into creating a formidable buffer against its enemies.  The Druze are loyal to the country they live in, which means the Syrian regime has benefited from outsized Druze support even during its lowest point during the civil war. Yet, Hader lies far West from the Syrian Druze main area called Jabal Al-Druze or Druze mountain.

Due to Hader’s location, Syria has been unable to apply its control there, which gives Israel the possibility for establishing a forward base in Syria, which can be used to push back Iranian control in the area. It is not clear how serious Hader is about its desires for Israeli help or even the ability for the IDF to enter, but given the fact that the region is under remendous mount of chaos, there is a logic in rethinking the borders and relationships in the area.  With the Druze finding success in Israel in a way they don’t in other areas, a unique opportunity may now exist to reach out to Druze communities in Southern Lebanon and Western Syria by offering a chance to ensure these communities security and prosperity under an expanded Israeli security umbrella.

This would send a message to Iran and even Russia that they are not the only ones that can shape and change assumed regional foundations.  The Syckes-Picot agreement has been buried.  It appears to be time for Israel to take charge and push back against Iranian and Russian machinations. Hader is the first test.

Israel Hits Back at Syria after Regime Opens Fire on Israeli Aircraft

Syrian surface to air batteries opened fire on a Israeli jets as they were conducting a routine flight over Southern Lebanon earlier today.

The aircraft returned fire destroying the missile battery.  With the region inching towards war, the Syrian regime may be trying to heat up Israel’s Northern border. With rocket attacks from the Sinai last night and today’s Northern incident, Syria and Hezbollah appear to be ready to push towards Israel as the Syrian conflict winds down.

Given the events between Kurdistan and the Iranian affiliated Iraqi army, Iran’s proxies appear to have a ree light to mke a move against Israel.

 

“Conflict management”: The Collapse of a Concept

While Israel has been “managing the conflict”, its non-state adversaries have been enhancing their capabilities so dramatically that they now a grave strategic threat

…to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. ..–Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 431 BCE

This week, Israel conducted its largest military exercise for almost two decades code named “Or Hadagan” (“the Light of the Grain”), reportedly in honor of the late Meir Dagan, former director of Mossad.

Far reaching shift in threat perception

The drill, which took place in the north of the country, and involved tens of thousands of troops from all branches of the IDF, was intended to prepare the Israeli military for a possible future confrontation with Hezbollah.

This, in itself, reflects far-reaching changes in the realities on the ground and the resultant shift in Israeli threat perception and hence in the armed forces’ operational focus and strategic outlook  that have taken place since the end of the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

Thus, while the Syrian army has been almost totally eroded by six-and-a-half years of civil war; Israel now considers Hezbollah as the primary and most immediate threat, and the Lebanese front, the one of most pressing concern.

In many ways, the recognition of the ascendant threat from Hezbollah comprises a grave indictment of the conduct of the 2006 War—and an admission (at least implicitly) of its gross mismanagement.

This is significant, because the calm that has generally prevailed in the North since 2006 has —despite wide acknowledgment of the disappointing IDF performance in that engagement—led numerous pundits to applaud the deterrent effect that the massive damage inflicted on Lebanon at the time, allegedly produced.  In some cases, this prompted suggestions that a more favorable retrospective assessment of the war and its execution might be called for.

Sadly, there is little to support this benign attitude—and emerging realities serve only to underscore the long term detrimental impact, which  that indecisive encounter—and its subsequent political and strategic ramifications—have had (and are still likely to have) on Israel’s security.

“To defeat, not deter…”

But changing threat perception was not the only major shift in military thinking associated with the drill.  For the reported definition of its objectives seem to indicate an emerging awareness that the approach adopted over the last few decades has been both dysfunctional and detrimental.

Thus, in a recent opinion piece in Haaretz, entitled Israel Dare Not Allow Hezbollah to Strike First veteran commentator Israel Harel wrote: “For many years, including (or especially) the Second Lebanon War, the IDF did not truly aspire, as an army going to war must aspire, to defeat the enemy once and for all, in other words to neutralize its capacity to further endanger the lives of Israel’s citizens, soldiers and infrastructure.”

This time” he noted “the military commentators wrote and broadcast, the “intention” is clear: to finish (the word expressly used by the exercise’s commander) the enemy.”

Articulating the  move towards this new (or rather renewed) aspiration to defeat, rather than deter, the enemy was a report by Haaretz’s military correspondent, Amos Harel (not to be confused with previously-mentioned Israel Harel) in which the sub-headline declared: “Military says it will no longer settle for deterring Hezbollah, which replaced Syria as No. 1 threat on Israel’s borders.” Referring to the professed goal of the “Or Hadagan” drill, Harel wrote“ The objective is to defeat Hezbollah. This time the talk is not of inflicting significant harm to Hezbollah, to deter it, or to quash its desire to fight until the next round of violence.”

Conflict management: A concept discredited

The conceptual paradigm that forms the basis of the IDF’s aversion to victory-oriented strategies is the idea of “conflict management”. One of the prime proponents of this approach has been the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.

A synopsis  of “months of debate in BESA seminar rooms”  published about a year ago, reported that a consensus  had emerged among the  center’s experts that “Conflict management is currently the least-worst option”, and that it  “is wiser for Israel to defer action than to take steps that threaten to make a bad situation worse”.

Arguably, one of the most explicit advocates for the idea of conflict management is Prof. Efraim Inbar, formerly BESA’s longstanding director, who declared: “Israel’s recent governments are left, willy- nilly, with a de facto conflict-management approach, without foreclosing any options.” He conceded that: “there are costs to this wait and- see approach”, but counselled “…this was the approach favored by David Ben-Gurion. He believed in buying time to build a stronger state and in hanging on until opponents yield their radical goals …

In a 2014 policy paper entitled Mowing the Grass in Gaza and coauthored with Eitan Shamir, he set out the essence of this conflict management approach as it pertained to Hamas in Gaza:  “Israel is acting in accordance with a “mowing the grass” strategy. After a period of military restraint, Israel is acting to severely punish Hamas for its aggressive behavior, and degrading its military capabilities…The use of force… is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but rather is a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities”.

Clearly, this prescription has failed dismally both with regard to  Hamas and Hezbollah, neither of whom have had their capabilities “debilitated”, nor have forgone their “radical goals.

Conflict management discredited (cont.)

After all, not only is there any sign of either of these organizations moderating their radical rejectionist approach towards Israel, but the periods of inter-bellum calm have been consistently used by both to dramatically upgrade their capabilities.

Thus, when Israel left Gaza (2005), the range of the Palestinian rockets was barely 5 km., and the explosive charge they carried about 5 kg. Now their missiles have a range of over 100 km. and warheads of around 100 kg.

When Israel left Gaza, only the sparse population in its immediate proximity was threatened by missiles. Now well over 5 million Israelis, well beyond Tel Aviv, are menaced by them. To this alarming tally, add the massive array of attack tunnels that Hamas was able to develop since the evacuation while Israel was “mowing the lawn”, making any suggestion that its capabilities have been “debilitated” utterly ludicrous.

This is even more so  in the case of Hezbollah, who, since 2006, has reportedly increased its then-already formidable arsenal in South Lebanon, abandoned to them, courtesy of the hasty 2000 unilateral IDF withdrawal mandated by Ehud Barak, tenfold—to anywhere between 100,000 to 150,000!

Moreover, the improvement has not only been in the quantity of the missiles trained on Israel’s population centers, as well other civilian and military targets, but in the accuracy and the explosive charges of the war-heads. Likewise, the ranks of its fighters has more than doubled, and their operational capabilities greatly enhanced, among other things, due to the combat experience acquired through their participation in the Syrian Civil War.

Mistaking “regrouping” for “deterrence”

In light of all these daunting developments, it is clear that successive bouts of limited fighting have done little to deter either Hamas or Hezbollah in the sense of breaking their will to engage in battle. Rather, after every round, they have been forced to regroup, redeploy and rearm—only to  re-emerge spoiling for a fight, ever bolder, with ever-greater (indeed, once inconceivable) capabilities.

In this regard, a far from implausible claim could be made that it was not the consequences of the 2006 war that dissuaded Hezbollah from entering the fighting in 2014 to support Hamas against the IDF during Operation Protective Edge. Rather the fact that the organization was bogged down in the Syrian civil war, propping up their patron Bashar Assad—a fortuitous outcome that cannot really be ascribed to the efficacy of Israeli deterrence policy.

Accordingly, it is difficult to refute the recent cocky taunts of Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, that “Every time an Israeli official refers to Hezbollah’s growing power, he admits Israeli defeat in the summer of 2006”.  Well, at least if not defeat, denial of victory.

Indeed, just how appallingly the Second Lebanon War was conducted can be judged by the fact that, according to Israeli estimates, the number of missiles liable to rain down on Israel in any future confrontation with Hezbollah is somewhere between 1000 to 1500 a day—ten times that which fell in the previous war, and which kept millions of Israelis huddling in shelters for weeks on end.  Now imagine an assault ten-fold larger, factoring in the greater accuracy and greater explosive power of the missiles today—coupled with a possible auxiliary attack from Gaza…  

These are the bitter fruits that conflict management has produced.

There but for the grace of God…

Against this grim backdrop in Lebanon, the developing realities in Syria must be taken into consideration: The deployment of Russian forces and the growing dominance of the Iranian presence in the country.

If the ominous developments in Lebanon can, in large measure, be ascribed to the flaccid policies of the Olmert government; in Syria, they are due  to those of the Obama administration.

The former,  shackled to its political doctrine of territorial concession and compromise, could not take the necessary and timely action to bring Hezbollah to its knees in a humiliating defeat—and end the fighting with a white flag of surrender over the Hezbollah positions and Hezbollah combatants being led into Israeli captivity.

The latter, unshackled from a traditional view of American national interest, created a vacuum into which Russia and Iran inserted themselves. Of course, the Iranian activity in Syria (and elsewhere) has been greatly facilitated by the appallingly naïve (or is that nefarious?) agreement orchestrated by the Obama administration in July 2015 over Tehran’s nuclear program, which greatly empowered the Iranian theocracy, enriched it economically and entrenched it politically.

One of the many menacing aspects of this is that the strong Iranian presence in Syria will allow the deployment of its proxies—including Hezbollah—along the border in the Golan, effectively increasing the length of the front along which Israel will have to confront such forces in any future military encounter.

All this should cause us to shudder with dread at the thought that, had the “enlightened” voices of moderation, reason and understanding of the “Other”, carried the day, and Israel had withdrawn from the Golan, all these perils would be perched on the heights overlooking the Sea of Galilee, the city of Tiberias and much of northern Israel.

There but for the grace of God…

Backing away vs. backing into confrontations

For several years now I have been warning against clear and present dangers inherent in conflict management—cautioning that it is little more than “kicking the can down the road” into a risk fraught future.  I expressed growing concern that by adopting a policy of avoiding confrontations. which Israel could win, the government  may well back the nation  into a confrontation so severe that it may not—or only do so at devastating cost.

Now, faced with a prospect of thousands of rockets (many accurate and high explosive) being launched daily against Israel  along two possible fronts – an extended one in the north and one in the south; faced with the threat of an array of yet to be discovered terror tunnels—both in the north and the south; with these forces operating under the auspices of near-by Iranian troops and with the possibly inhibiting presence of Russia in the region,  we can only hope that such a crucial confrontation is not upon us.

But  should such a conflict erupt, our fervent wish must  be that the  IDF is not tempted to attempt to “manage” it, but be true to the declared aims of the “Or Hadagan” drill–and strive for unequivocal victory in it…

 

BREAKING: Israel Strikes Syrian Chemical Weapons, Assad Threatens to Retaliate

The Syrian military threatened a harsh response to Israel’s alleged attack on their chemical weapons facility near Massyaf in the Hama countryside.  The attack occurred at 2:42 AM from Lebanese airspace.

The SANA news service published the following Syrian military statement:

“This aggression comes in a desperate attempt to raise the collapsed morale of the ISIS terrorists after the sweeping victories achieved by the Syrian Arab Army against terrorism at more than one front, and it affirms the direct support provided by the Israeli entity to the ISIS and other terrorist organizations,” the Army Command said in a statement.

Israel warned Putin when Bibi visited the Russian leader in Sochi that he would not tolerate the Syrian regime and Iran closing in on Israel’s Golan border.  This attack is the first time Israel has struck since their meeting.

SANA reported the Syrian Military “warned against the dangerous repercussions of such hostile acts on the security and stability of the region.”

Amos Yadlin a retired Israeli General and now the Executive Director of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) released the following Tweets:

 

Yadlin’s hint that either Israel had tacit approval to fly through Russian installed radar systems or has found a way to evade detection should not be lost on anyone.  This point is key to understanding Israel’s ability to keep an edge in the next war which appears to be fast approaching.

The fact is the attack took place North of Lebanon, so if it was indeed Israel, Russia must have known about it and if Russia knew about, why would they let Israel bomb Syria?

The answer lies in Putin’s balance strategy which involves playing Syria and Israel off each other. This does not mean Israel has a green light.  Actually, the opposite is true.  Israel must go to Putin to ask permission when it needs to hit a Syrian facility.

The fact is, most observers bought into the viewpoint that Bibi got nothing from Putin in Sochi.  Russia’s disinformation magazine Pravda indicated this:

“According to eyewitnesses of the open part of the talks, the Israeli prime minister was too emotional and at times even close to panic. He described a picture of the apocalypse to the Russian president that the world may see if no efforts are taken to contain Iran, which, as Netanyahu believes, is determined to destroy Israel.”

Yet, the strike in the early morning hours so close to Latkia and near Homs indicates Putin has held true to his policy of keeping strategic balance in the region. The real question is: Will this would also apply to Iranian forces near the Golan?

Putin continues to play puppet master in the Levant, but his puppeteering is setting up the region for all out war. Will this give Putin the chance to play peacemaker?

Threat of Hezbollah Invasion is Real as IDF Holds Largest Drill in 20 Years

In what began yesterday and will continue for 10 days, the IDF will simulate a real war, including invasion with Hezbollah.  Known as “the Light of the Grain,” or “Or HaDagan” the drill is Israel’s largest in 20 years and was called in a surprise fashion due to the growing tensions with Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.

According to the army, the number of reservists taking part in the exercise is “unprecedented” with one IDF official saying the following:

“The purpose of the large call-up of reservists is to prepare the reserve force for war in the northern arena and to adapt it to the changes and developing threats of recent years.”

Since part of the exercise simulates a Hezbollah invasion of Northern Israel, soldiers are due to dress the part with some acting out enemy roles within pre-selected communities and others acting to repel hem.

The possibility of invasion appears to be so real that the IDF Home Front Command will practice its “Safe Distance” plan.  The plan will see communities near the Lebanese border evacuated farther south in order to keep them out of harm’s way.

Dealing with Three Fronts

As the Syrian regime and Iran consolidate their hold over Syria and Hezbollah strengthens itself in Southern Lebanon, the threats against Israel have begin to multiply.  Given the fact that Russia appears disinterested in helping to tame the situation and will most likely protect Iranian and Syrian regime forces, the coming war is far more complicated than in the past.

Add to this a USA who is phasing itself out of the Middle East and this leaves Israel pretty much on its own. Given the heightened tensions between North Korea and the USA as well as the coming referendum for Kurdish independence, anyone event could very well trigger an expanded regional war leaving Israel to fend for itself.

Has Israel Reached the End of its Detente with Russia?

Iran Attack Israel

There had been signs for months that the “special” understandings reached between Putin and Bibi Netanyahu were fraying.  Afterall, Israel never chose to have Russia interject itself into the Syrian civil war, but once it had done so, Israel had no choice but to try to tame the Russian Bear.  The understandings reached allowed Israel a level of continued independence to strike out against Syrian convoys heading towards Lebanon.  When Iran started moving closer, Israel was allowed to hit sensitive figures.

Despite all of this, there was always the need to ask for permission and reestablish the understandings, which according to reports have contantly changed.

With Trump and Putin reaching an understanding at the G20 that allowed Russia to man the borders of Israel and Jordan in order to supposedly “enforce” a ceasefire, the understandings between Israel and Russia broke apart.

Israel can handle a Russia farther North from the Golan who is focused more on creating stability for its Mediteranean port at Latkia, but a Russia intensely involved with allowing Iranian troops and the militia it supports to reach the Golan border is completely unacceptable.

When Bibi travelled to Sochi over ten days ago, the prevailing assumption was that he would be able to convince Putin that it is in Russia’s best interest to hold back Iran and in failing to do so Israel would have no choice but to attack the Iranian forces.




Russia would have none of it and has since pushed back strongly against Israel’s verbage and protests against the Iranian presence on its border.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the following about Israel’s concerns that Iran is building up strength in the Golan to attack Israel:

 “We do not have any information that someone is preparing an attack on Israel. Whatever area of cooperation between Iran and Syria, my position is that if their cooperation in whichever field does not violate the basic provisions of international law, it should not be cause for question,” Lavrov said.

So the proverbial goal posts of past understandings between Israel and Russia have once again been moved, but in the direction of the Israeli border.  Where at one time Russia acquiesced to Israel’s concerns about Iran’s proximity to their Northeastern border, today they just have to “behave” and all is well.

The emerging crisis on Israel’s border with Syria is no small matter.  Under Russian protection Iranian troops can operate freely and this being the case, Iranian agents can always lay the groundwork to be ready when Russia changes the rules again.

Bibi Netanyahu has a huge choice to make.  He can either keep the facade that Russia is an honest broker between the Jewish state and Iran and therefore allow Israel to become fully surrounded and in a sense dependent on Russia for holding back Iran or he can drop the facade and take out the Iranian forces quickly establishing themselves in the Syrian Golan.

His choice will determine the costs involved when the war in Israel’s North begins.

 

Is Putin Ready to Throw Iran Under the Bus?

The announcement that Prime Minister Netanyahu and Russia’s President Putin are set to meet this Wednesday the 23rd of August in the Russian resort city of Sochi doesn’t seem to stand out as significant.  Afterall, the two men meet every few months to prevent any friction between their countries.

So what makes this meeting so different?

In the span of time between the their last face to face meeting, President Donald Trump acquiesced to allow Russian armed observers to man the borders of Israel and Jordan.  This was under the guise of ensuring a ceasefire between the Syrian regime and rebel forces. Although there were some rocky first moments, the plan has brought a modicum of quiet to the areas in question.

The challenge for Israel has been what the Syrian Regime and Iran are using the “ceasefire” for. It has become clear that Iran and Syria are seeking near control of the Golan border area.  This they have accomplished by way of their Russian allies.

What’s Next for Iran and Russia?

The prevailing assumption has been that Putin would give Iran enough of a leash to clear out the rebels in Syria, but not enough for either Iran or Syria to be dominant in the Levant without the go ahead from Russia.  While it is important to understand that any overt alliance puts Israel’s security at risk, the now quarterly meetings between Bibi and Putin mitigated much of this. Of course, all of this depends on Putin holding Iran and Syria back from placing game changing forces on the Syrian side of the Golan.

Iran and Russia have a working understanding that Iran can do what is necessary to clear the rebels and ISIS out, but given Putin and Bibi’s deconfliction understandings anything else would be deemed an abrogation of the working agreement between Tehran and Moscow.  The ceasefire agreement between Trump and Putin made during the G20 Summit is a good test of this.  For the first time Russia would open a corridor for Iranian troops to move right up to the Golan, yet the actual movement of those troops negates the deconfliction strategy with Israel.

Up until now Russia has allowed the IAF to strike where it needs to against Iran. More than that, sources tell us that Putin even relays targeting information personally to Bibi.  Iran and Syria maybe allowed utilize the ceasefire to move troops to the Golan, but if the past is any kind of predictor then they are on their own.

While most pundits believe these sorts of actions will eventually spell the end of the Iranian-Russian Alliance this is more of the same for Putin.  He relishes in playing multiple sides of each other in order to effectively control the situation.

Reaffirming the Deconfliction Understandings and More…

Bibi’s trip to Moscow is more about reaffirming the deconlfiction understandings in light of the new reality of Russia’s troops now manning the Golan border. Russia has no interest in allowing Iran to attack Israel, which would fully destabilize the region.  Putin wants recognition by Israel that Russia is the new player in the Levant and that it Israel will have to reevaluate how it relates to the fast changing Middle East.

Putin will keep allowing Israel to attack Iranian and Syrian targets. In Putin’s grand strategy this keeps the region in balance while he continues to take more and more control.

As America continues to minimize its overt involvement in the Middle East, the vacuum created is leading to a new order with its strings more or less being pulled by Moscow.

Israel’s goal is to hold onto to its security independence while treading carefully though a new Middle East.

 

Why Does Israel Oppose the Syrian Ceasefire?

Reports in the media indicate that Prime Minister Netanyahu opposes the ceasefire in Southwestern Syria. The Hill quotes a source from Haaretz that “Netanyahu told French President Emmanuel Macron during a meeting Sunday that Israel does not support the agreement.”

The question is why.  Afterall, on paper quiet in the Southwest on the border of Israel’s Golan Heights is a good thing.  No one in the Israeli government would argue with quiet, yet the nature of the ceasefire allows for Russian observers to man the border region.  This is a huge capitulation on behalf of the Trump administration.  Up until the ceasefire, Israel could, when necessary hit back against Iranian, Hezbollah, and Syrian movements and arms smuggling.  Now that Russian are essentially in the same locations, Israel will now have to make sure not to hit Russian forces while battling parties aimed at its destruction.

More than this, Putin seems intent on playing both sides.  While he has set up a “deconfliction mechanism” with Israel, Putin keeps on moving the goal posts closer to Israel, which effectively renders the “deconfliction mechanism” pointless.

Most analysts, including myself are betting on a new round of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel sooner rather than later, regardless of the Trump-Putin ceasefire. Israel will have to hit quick and successfully in order minimize the amount of destruction it receives back at home.  With Russia in the mix, this ability to wipe out Hezbollah missile infrastructure is severely hampered, especially since Iran and Syria have openly allowed Hezbollah to set up forward bases from Syrian territory. Considering our report yesterday about the ballistic missile factory now set up in Syria, Trump’s ceasefire appears to not only harm Israel, but ultimately America.

The Trump administration might have lowered the risks of going against Putin in Syria, but the White House’s decision has left the region far more imperiled than before.